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12 APR 1965

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Search/Surveillance Steering Group

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1. [] has been participating on Dr. McMillan's Steering Group and Task Force which was set up to examine requirements for characteristics of a new Search/Surveillance Photo Satellite System. The final report of the Task Force is to be presented to the Steering Group on 15 April 1965 and upon approval there, might form an important input to the final decision with respect to a new system. A copy of this Task Force final report with a summary is attached.

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2. Under the terms of reference of his participation, [] has submitted his own personal professional judgments on the Task Force final report by memo to Dr. McMillan, a copy of which is attached. In order to insure that a complete and appropriate evaluation be made of the Steering Group's final product, I recommend that you send the attached letter to Mr. Vance.

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ALBERT D. WHEELON
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

Attachments

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1. Copy of Task Force Final Report with Summary Analysis.
2. Copy of Memo [] to Dr. McMillan.
3. Draft letter to Mr. Vance.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Steering Group

SUBJECT: Final Task Force Report


1. A letter from DDCI to DNRO dated 14 December 1964 contains the terms of reference for my participation in the Task Force and the Steering Group. In essence, I am limited to furnishing technical competence, but in no way can I commit the DCI nor CIA to the findings. For this reason, the following comments must be considered my own personal views, based on my understanding and appreciation of the technical and analytical aspects of the problems.

2. As a member of both the Task Force and the Steering Group, I find it a problem as to the proper procedure for making any personal contribution. In view of the short time between receipt of the subject document and the 15 April meeting of the Steering Group to discuss it, I chose to send these comments to you as well as to the Chairman of the Task Force.


3. In general, I find the Program Characteristics quite a good effort and, in my judgment, necessary to the translation of intelligence requirements into system characteristics and specifications. However, there are several key points which bother me. The first is the restriction of the booster choice to one in the Titan III family. This restriction, so far as I can tell, was not based on a complete examination and study of booster capabilities vs requirements, considering trade-offs. As you know, a very great amount of detailed work has been done elsewhere on this problem with somewhat different conclusions. Other factors important, but not to my knowledge adequately considered in the booster

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
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SUBJECT: Final Task Force Report

specification, include the proved reliability, the built-in fast reaction capability, and the extensive available launch facilities of the Titan II as compared to the Titan III family. This is not to say that some day a Titan IIIX/Agona will not be reliable -- it will -- but at an as yet undetermined cost in dollars, time and operational failures.


4. I find an additional problem with the justification for including, as a primary requirement, Crisis Operation -- especially since this inclusion has such a large impact on the system configuration in terms of orbit flexibility. I was not aware of any effort to evaluate the penalty, either in effectiveness or cost, to the general search and surveillance capability caused by inclusion of the Crisis capability. Furthermore, the Crisis objectives appear to be rather undefined, at least in the sense of not specifying whether strategic indicator targets or crisis locale targets are considered.

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6. A fourth major question I have with respect to the program characteristics is the need for and cost of additional capabilities I believe that additional capability, beyond the basic search and surveillance, must really be justified in a specific sense rather than in a generalized way. Even growth in the basic capability needs quantitative justification. To the extent that more capability can be justified, I believe that cogent reasons can be developed for, first, more film, and second, ultra-thin base film. Extended active orbit life do not, in my judgment, look desirable in terms of overall system cost effectiveness.


7. Additional questions which I have include:

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[Redacted]

8. I am submitting these comments in the hope that they might, in a constructive way, contribute to the early operational use of an intelligence gathering system optimized in the National interest.

SIGNED

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[Redacted]

Distribution:

- Copy 1 - Dr. McMillan
- " 2 - Dr. McMillan
- " 3 -
- " 4 - DCI (through DDCI)
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- " 6 - DDS&T Registry
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Deputy Secretary of Defense

Washington, D. C.

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DCI (through DDCI)
per in your letter of


17 November 1964, you requested CIA participation in a Steering Group and Task Force to examine the requirements and alternatives for a new Search/Surveillance Satellite System. In my letter of 3 December 1964, I suggested that the proposed terms of reference of the Group be modified to avoid overlaps or duplication with the USIB structure and approved the requested CIA participation. Even though the suggested modifications to the terms of reference were not made, I approved the participation of [redacted] and Mr. Lundahl subject to the provision that such participation would not commit in any way the DCI or CIA to the Steering Group findings.

I have recently seen a copy of the final report of the Task Force and find a number of problems with it. Without prejudging the Steering Group actions on the Task Force report, I would like you to send me the Final Report of the Steering Group for Agency study and comment before any actions are authorized or implemented.

Yours very truly,

John A. McCone
Director

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6 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Search/Surveillance System Steering Group.

1. There will be a meeting of the Steering Group (chaired by Dr. McMillan) on 15 April 1965 to receive the Task Force final report, which includes "Program Characteristics for a Future Search/Surveillance Reconnaissance System" and "Suggested System Evaluation Criteria". The Task Force earlier presented to the Steering Group a "Review of Intelligence Requirements for Search and Surveillance Satellite Reconnaissance".

2. The Program Characteristics report includes a summary of requirements largely taken from USIB D41.14/229. However, the Search and Surveillance requirement includes, as one of the primary goals, the need for operation of the system during periods of Crisis against any selected area of the world. The Crisis aspect imposes on the System the need for additional flexibility in targetting, as well as minimum response and data retrieval times as integral characteristics. Corollary requirements, to be met without interference with the primary goals, include technical intelligence, bomb damage assessment during general war, and Mapping, Charting and Geodesy. Important system implications for these corollary requirements include ground and on orbit survivability, and [REDACTED]

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